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Chapter 8 
Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame 
Sebastian Schmidt 
 
1. Introduction 
Philosophical thought about responsibility is traditionally structured by taking actions and 
their consequences as the kinds of things for which we are responsible.1 This way of thinking 
about responsibility highlights a difference between two modes of being responsible: direct 
and indirect responsibility. On the one hand, our actions are exercises of voluntary control, 
and we perform our actions for reasons. Their causal consequences, on the other hand, are not 
exercises of control, and they are no things performed for reasons.2 Our responsibility for con-
sequences originates in our responsibility for actions which cause them.3 This allows us to say 
that we are directly responsible for our actions, but only indirectly responsible for their conse-
quences. Whenever we are responsible for a consequence, our responsibility can be traced 
back to our responsibility for prior actions.4 
If we try to put attitudes within this traditional framework, we are faced with a puzzle. 
On the one hand, it seems that we lack direct control over our attitudes. In this respect, atti-
tudes behave similarly to mere consequences of our actions. Indeed, it seems undeniable that 
they are sometimes consequences of our actions, and that we thus have, to a certain extent, in-
direct control over them: we can manage our emotions through, say, meditation, and we can 
form justified beliefs by, for example, proper investigation. Yet it is hard to see what another, 
more direct, kind of control over attitudes is supposed to look like. If we lack direct control 
over our attitudes, it seems that we should conclude that we are only indirectly responsible for 
our attitudes – in the same way as we are responsible for consequences of our actions. 
On the other hand, our attitudes are within the “space of reasons”: they are subject to 
evaluations to which brute consequences of actions could never be subject to. Attitudes can-
not only be evaluated as better or worse to have (as consequences can be evaluated as better 
or worse). Rather, we think of our attitudes as rational or irrational. In this respect, it seems 
that our attitudes do not behave like mere consequences of our actions: if I fall from the roof 
 
 
due to my carelessness, my broken leg will be my fault, but my broken leg is not irrational. 
Given our attitude’s presence in the space of reasons, they seem to be much more like actions 
themselves rather than their consequences. We are tempted to conclude from this second line 
of thought that we must be also directly responsible for our attitudes (in addition to sometimes 
being indirectly responsible for them). 
Luckily, we need not decide between both lines of thought. We can endorse both. Or 
so I argue. We can claim that each of them is sound as long as we say that each of them is 
sound for another face of responsibility for attitudes. To see this, we first need to get a grip on 
the problem created by the two lines of thought. Understanding the nature of this problem is 
half the way to its solution. After sketching my assumptions about reasons and rationality in 
this paper (section 2), I will argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is ultimately 
a problem about reasons for attitudes (section 3). Resolving it requires us, first and foremost, 
to understand the status of the norms of rationality as compared to the status of requirements 
of prudence and morality. In order to motivate my own approach on understanding this status, 
I first spell out an argument that calls into question the normative force, and thus the very ex-
istence, of reasons for attitudes (section 4). The argument works with a plausible conceptual 
claim about how reasons and blameworthiness are related. In reply to the argument, I show 
how we can be held directly responsible for our attitudes, and how this makes the normative 
force of reasons for attitudes intelligible (section 5). This provides the outlines of a solution to 
the problem of mental responsibility (section 6). 
 
2. Rationality and Reasons 
Following the recent defenses by Kiesewetter (2017) and Lord (2018), I assume a reasons-
based conception of rationality, rather than a conception of rationality as mental coherence 
(cf. Broome 2013). To be rational is to respond correctly to one’s overall accessible reasons 
for an attitude. If it would turn out that rationality cannot be understood as responding cor-
rectly to reasons, then my overall argument is not affected. This is because I am interested in 
the normative force of reasons for attitudes rather than the normative force of attitudinal co-
herence. If you do not agree with reasons-based conceptions of rationality, you are free to 
read my use of “rational” as stipulative: it refers to the property of an attitude of being ade-
quately based on the subject’s accessible reasons for this attitude. 
To be rational means, according to my terminology, to respond correctly to one’s ob-
ject-given reasons for the attitude.5 Object-given reasons for an attitude are reasons that indi-
cate (or constitute) facts about the attitude’s object rather than about the attitude itself – facts 
 
 
that support the attitude, or make it rational to have the attitude, by indicating (or constituting) 
that the attitude (partly) fulfills its constitutive aim. For example, object-given reasons for be-
liefs are (or are provided by) evidence, because evidence indicates the truth of the object of 
the belief, i.e., the truth of the belief’s propositional content. Scientific reports on climate 
change are thus object-given reasons for belief: they indicate that human-induced climate 
change takes place. By contrast, that I feel less existential angst if I do not believe in climate 
change is a state-given reason not to believe in climate change. It is not an object-given rea-
son (i.e., no evidence, or not provided by evidence) against climate-change, because this fact 
does not indicate that the belief fulfills its constitutive aim of truth. 
Analogously, an object-given reason for a desire shows the object of the desire to be 
desirable in some respect; object-given reasons for fear indicate the danger of what you fear, 
and thus make it rational to experience fear;6 object-given reasons for intention are reasons for 
the object of intention – i.e., the intended action: that I will get poisoned if I drink a toxin is 
an object-given reason not to intend to drink it (and a reason not to drink it); that I get a lot of 
money for intending to drink a toxin is a state-given reason to intend to drink it.7 
In contrast to object-given reasons, state-given reasons indicate (or constitute) facts 
about the state of the attitude itself. The most important category of state-given reasons under 
discussion are practical reasons for attitudes, i.e., reasons that support the attitude by indicat-
ing the attitude’s value.8 According to those who believe in such practical reasons – i.e., prag-
matists –, the fact that it would be beneficial to believe in a guarding angel (e.g., because one 
would sleep better at night) could be a practical reason to believe in a guarding angel (even in 
the absence of sufficient evidence).9 Analogously, facts about the value of any other attitude 
are considered to be reasons for this attitude by pragmatists. 
It is often argued that practical reason are no reasons for attitudes, but rather mere 
considerations indicating the attitude’s value.10 They are no reasons because if they were, 
then we would sometimes be able to form attitudes for practical reasons: we could believe, 
desire, feel, or intend at will. We could just decide not to fear a dangerous tiger or just decide 
to intend to drink a poisonous liquid merely because we regard fearing or intending to be ben-
eficial. I will assume here that we cannot adopt attitudes at will, and I thus agree that practical 
reasons are, strictly speaking, no reasons for the attitude they seem to favour.11 
 
3. The Problem 
McCormick helpfully characterizes the conflict between responsibility for belief and the ab-
sence of doxastic control as follows:  
 
 
 
Attributions of responsibility and other deontological judgments in the doxastic realm are 
puzzling. For much of what we believe is beyond our control; we cannot decide to believe 
the way we can decide to act. It seems that such lack of control should excuse us from re-
sponsibility and judgment. (McCormick 2015: 77) 
 
As McCormick notes, the problem is not restricted to responsibility for beliefs. It seems that 
deontological attribution with respect to belief is puzzling in the face of our lack of doxastic 
control. After all, in some sense it seems to be true that “Ought implies Can.” But how can 
sentences like “You should not believe this nonsense” or “There is no reason at all to believe 
this” be true if there is no doxastic control, that is, no “Can”? The very possibility of an ethics 
of belief, as well as the project of normative or deontological epistemology, seems to become 
questionable.12  
Are we dealing with one problem here, or with two? Is there a problem about respon-
sibility on the one hand, and a problem about reasons, justification, and rationality, on the 
other? In this section, I will argue that the problem of mental responsibility is best understood 
as the problem of reasons for attitudes. Seeing this will allow us to rule out accounts that want 
to solve the problem by appeal to indirect control, and it will allow us to see the candidate so-
lutions. 
 
3.1 How we seem to lack mental control 
Let us consider, first, why it seems that we cannot control our beliefs. Most of our beliefs 
seem to be passively caused by our environment. We experience the acquisition of a percep-
tual belief – like the belief that you are reading this text right now – as something that hap-
pens to us, rather than something we decide for. You do not stop and reflect upon whether 
you should acquire this belief after the text is in front of your eyes. Rather, belief comes im-
mediately with perception. The same holds in cases where our perception provides us with 
ambiguous evidence. In these cases, we refrain from judgment quite automatically. To take a 
classical example (cf. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I.32): If a tower seems to be 
round from distance and I know that I am not close enough for judging the tower’s shape, I 
cannot just decide to believe whatever strikes me as pleasing to believe. Rather, I refrain from 
judging quite automatically. If, however, I am close enough to the tower, I will come to be-
lieve what shape it really is without any further contribution from me (except for walking to-
wards it). 
 
 
Even in cases where we reflect about what to believe, there seems to be no place for 
genuine doxastic freedom. Imagine a scientist, Lara, who wants to find out whether a certain 
substance is water. Lara conducts some experiments, thinks about them, and comes to believe 
that it is in fact water. It seems that the only activities Lara did here were the experiments and 
her intentional deliberating or reasoning about what is true. Lara did not perform another ac-
tion when she was done with her thinking. She did not have to actively form a belief. Rather, 
her thinking concluded in the formation of a belief, but this concluding is not an additional ac-
tivity she had to perform. 
This is confirmed by the following observation. Lara could engage in the experiments 
she conducts and in her activity of thinking for practical reasons: She could decide to engage 
in them or refrain from doing them depending on whether it was important or of interest to 
know the nature of the substance. By contrast, she could not decide to conclude her investiga-
tion for such reasons: considerations about whether it would be good, valuable, important, in-
teresting, or useful to believe that the substance in question is water could not guide the for-
mation of her belief when she is done with her previous activities. Rather, she will form the 
belief based on her evidence that was uncovered by the preceding investigation.13 
Thus, there is a dilemma for the proponent of doxastic control: Either we form our be-
liefs spontaneously; or we form them reflectively. Spontaneous belief formation seems to 
happen quite automatically, and thus there seems to be no room for genuine freedom. How-
ever, even when we form our beliefs reflectively, only our reflection, or intentional thinking, 
is active, but not the formation of our belief that results from it. As Richard Moran points out: 
“[T]here is no further thing the person does in order to acquire the relevant belief once his 
reasoning has led him to it” (2001: 119). Our rational capacities just work the way they do – 
we do not exercise direct control over the results of their proper functioning. It seems that it is 
not us, but rather our evidential situation, together with the way our rational capacities func-
tion, that determines what we believe in each situation – in which we might happen to be ei-
ther with or without our contribution (cf. Strawson 2003). 
This is a dilemma not only for the proponent of direct doxastic control, but for the pro-
ponent of direct control over attitudes in general. Most of our attitude-forming takes place 
without us being reflectively aware of it. We spontaneously form not only numerous beliefs 
about our environment, but also other attitudes. We form desires and intentions to make it in 
time to the meeting, hopes that we will still make it, fears that we won’t, regrets that we did 
not get up earlier to make it in time, or feelings of anger and resentment directed at the person 
in the car in front of us who did not drive on when they had green lights. In these cases, we 
 
 
would not even have the time to decide for our attitudes, even if we could. And even if we 
have the time to form our desires, intentions, and emotions reflectively, then we might inten-
tionally engage in the activity of thinking about what is good, right, fearsome, regrettable, or 
deserving of our anger and blame. But the attitudes that arise from such voluntarily controlled 
thinking are nothing we choose. Even if we actively think about how to decide, it seems that 
our resulting intention or decision is nothing that we could ever directly decide for.14 
 
3.2 How lack of voluntary control does not threaten mental responsibility 
How could this lack of control over attitudes pose a problem for our practice of holding each 
other responsible for our attitudes? It is helpful to state the problem as a conflict of three 
claims which, when all true, would result in a contradiction. Thus, to resolve the conflict, we 
have to reject at least one of the three claims.15 A first try would be to state the problem as 
follows: (1*) We are responsible for our attitudes; (2*) We are responsible for our attitudes 
only if we can control them; (3*) We cannot control our attitudes.  
The problem with this way of formulating the puzzle is that (3*) would be obviously 
false. As mentioned on various points before, we have at least indirect control over our men-
tal states: we can meditate, investigate, and actively engage in thought and reasoning. We can 
also control our mind indirectly by engaging in projects of acquiring, say, true beliefs and 
other correct attitudes (right intentions, fitting emotions) about Sankt Petersburg by going 
there and walking through the city. So, this first attempt of formulating the problem does not 
get at its core. 
Given that it is not any control that seems lacking, but voluntary control, that is, the 
kind of direct control we have over our actions, we could put (3*) not in terms of control, but 
rather in terms of voluntary control. Still, this would not get to the core of the problem. Note 
that our exercises of voluntary control – our actions – are subject to requirements of prudence 
and morality. If we had voluntary control over beliefs, we could evaluate someone’s beliefs in 
terms of how beneficial they are to the person who has them, or in terms of how harmful they 
are to others. Yet we would not be justified in holding people accountable for their epistemic 
failures: we would not be justified in regarding someone as criticizable or blameworthy for 
their epistemic irrationality, i.e., for someone’s failure to have beliefs that are properly based 
on their evidence. For we would only be justified to blame or criticize someone for their irra-
tionality if this irrationality is bad either in terms of prudence or morality. Yet it seems that 
 
 
we are sometimes justified to blame or criticize people for failing to properly base their be-
liefs on their evidence rather than for failing to have beliefs that are not harmful for them-
selves or for others. 
One reply is, of course, to just deny that there is such a thing as epistemic blame: we 
never blame people merely for being epistemically irrational; rather, we blame them for irra-
tionality only if their irrationality is harmful to themselves or to others. We will return to this 
option of denying the existence of epistemic blame as well as other forms of blame for hold-
ing attitudes in section 4. For now, it is sufficient to note that denying the criticizability of ir-
rationality would be highly controversial in the context of contemporary philosophical de-
bates. The claim that irrationality is criticizable can be viewed as a starting intuition for de-
fenses of the normativity of rationality (cf. esp. Kiesewetter 2017, chapter 2). If we are criti-
cizable or blameworthy (in what follows, I will stick with the label “blame” instead of “criti-
cism” for the sake of brevity) for such failures in our rationality, then voluntary control over 
attitudes would provide an extensionally inadequate explanation of our blameworthiness for 
irrationality: we would be blameworthy only if our irrationality is prudentially or morally bad. 
Note that the kind of responsibility we have for complying to the norms of rationality 
cannot straightforwardly explained by reference to indirect control. Indirect control does a 
good job in explaining why we are responsible for phenomena that are not responsive to rea-
sons, and thus cannot be evaluated as rational or irrational, like brute sensations. The question 
“Why do you feel pain?” can only be answered by giving a causal explanation (“I fell from 
the roof”). It cannot be answered by giving justifying reasons why it would be rational to feel 
pain now. For pain, understood as a mere sensation which can occur at various bodily parts, 
cannot be rational or irrational. It is because of this difference between mere consequences of 
our actions and reasons-responsive attitudes that our responsibility for the former (which in-
clude some of our sensations, like pain) is exhausted by indirect responsibility, but that our 
responsibility for attitudes is not – at least not as long as we assume that we are directly re-
sponsible for being (ir)rational. If we are directly responsible for being (ir)rational, then there 
will be cases conceivable in which we lack indirect voluntary control over an attitude, but 
where we are still responsible for the attitude. For the attitude might be considered as (ir)ra-
tional even if we could not exercise indirect control over it. I take this to be an intuitively 
plausible assumption about the norms of rationality. 
Thus, any account that explains mental responsibility in terms of voluntary control 
must deny that we are directly responsible for being (ir)rational. Otherwise, explaining mental 
 
 
responsibility by reference to direct voluntary control would result in an extensionally inade-
quate account of blameworthiness for attitudes; and explaining it with indirect voluntary con-
trol would result in an extensionally inadequate account of responsibility for attitudes.16 
Proponents of explanations of mental responsibility in terms of voluntary control 
could argue that I misconstrued the nature of rationality. They could adopt a pragmatist ac-
count of attitudinal rationality: such a pragmatist account claims, roughly, that to have ra-
tional attitudes is to have attitudes that are, on balance, prudentially and morally best to 
have.17 However, this is just to deny that we are ever held accountable for failures to respond 
correctly to our object-given reasons for attitudes: it is to deny that we are responsible for be-
ing (ir)rational in the way I use the term ‘(ir)rational’ (see section 2 above). Intuitively, how-
ever, we are sometimes blameworthy for failing to comply with our object-given reasons. 
 
3.3 How lack of the right kind of mental control threatens mental responsibility 
Since the problem of mental responsibility calls for an explanation (at least also) of the kind 
of responsibility we have for (non-)compliance with the norms of rationality, and since it 
seems that this responsibility can be made intelligible neither by direct nor by indirect volun-
tary control, we should now try the following formulation: (1**) We are responsible for (non-
)compliance with the norms of rationality; (2**) We can only be responsible for such (non-
)compliance if we have direct non-voluntary control over our attitudes; (3**) We do not have 
such direct non-voluntary control. 
I think this is a better way to state the problem. Yet we might wonder why (2**) is 
true as stated. For what is non-voluntary control supposed to be? Intuitively, the control we 
exercise when we act – direct voluntary control – is our only paradigm of direct control, and 
this is the kind of control that (at least partly) explains why we are responsible for our actions 
and their consequences. So how could a non-voluntary control explain norms? Since it seems 
that we do not know much about the nature of this control, we also do not see, prima facie, 
how it could do this trick. It thus seems that, intuitively, there is no form of control – direct or 
indirect, voluntary or non-voluntary – that could explain how we are responsible for being 
(ir)rational. 
The norms of rationality are constitutive standards for an attitude: the more irrational 
someone is, the less we can be sure what attitudes the person holds. If someone says that they 
believe that drinking water from the sink at midnight on a certain date has healing effects, but 
also believes in the epistemic authority of contemporary physics and thus accepts a natural-
istic world-view, then we normally do not only regard the person to be irrational, but we 
 
 
might also come to doubt whether the person has one of the beliefs we ascribe to them. The 
more inconsistent someone’s set of beliefs is, the more doubtful it is what it is that the person 
believes. More generally: the more a person violates the norms of rationality, the more doubt-
ful it is what attitudes the person holds.18 
If we are indeed responsible for complying with these constitutive standards, i.e., the 
norms of rationality, and if it is not obvious what form of control could explain this, then we 
have an interesting version of the problem of mental responsibility: 
 
(1) We are responsible to the standards of rationality. 
(2) We can only be responsible to the standards of rationality if there is some form of 
control that could explain why we are responsible to the standards of rationality. 
(3) There is no form of control that could explain why we are responsible to the stand-
ards of rationality. 
 
The plausibility of (1) derives from the intuition that being irrational – failing to respond cor-
rectly to one’s object-given reasons – is blameworthy in some sense. This implies that we are 
responsible for (non-)compliance with the standards of rationality: we are legitimately subject 
to various reactive attitudes in virtue of our being rational or irrational. As a shorthand formu-
lation, I will say that we are responsible to the standards of rationality. The plausibility of (2) 
derives from the intuition that responsibility requires control, or “Ought implies Can” – a claim 
that is, in one version or another, accepted also by philosophers concerned with the standards 
of rationality (cf. Kiesewetter 2017: 28; Wedgwood 2017, chapter 3). I have already motivated 
the idea that there seems to be no such thing as direct control over our attitudes (in 3.1), and 
that our familiar paradigm of control – voluntary control (direct or indirect) – cannot do the job 
of explaining why there is such a thing as responsibility to the standards of rationality (in section 
3.2). This motivates (3). In order to resolve our philosophical perturbation caused by the three 
claims, we need to find reasons for rejecting at least one of them. 
Thus, all the premises are intuitively plausible. There are at least two other advantages 
of understanding the problem of mental responsibility in this way. First, we know better what 
it is that requires an explanation. Merely saying that we need to explain how we can be re-
sponsible for our attitudes leaves it unclear what exactly it is that requires an explanation. For 
it is obvious that we can be said to be sometimes responsible for our attitudes in the same way 
as we can be said to be sometimes responsible for other consequences of our actions. We are 
indirectly responsible for our attitudes in this way insofar as we have indirect control over our 
 
 
attitudes: we can intentionally reason to beliefs, manage our emotions by meditation, and de-
termine our intentions and decisions by intentionally thinking about what to do. If we under-
stand the problem as merely requiring an explanation of our responsibility for attitudes with-
out specifying what kind of responsibility we have in mind, then it is unclear why indirect 
voluntary control does not provide a satisfying explanation. Yet, as I have argued above, it is 
intuitively unclear how our capacity to indirectly control our mind can explain why we are re-
sponsible for (non-)compliance to the norms of rationality. Indirect responsibility for attitudes 
seems thus not to exhaust our responsibility for them. Since we do not see what kind of con-
trol could explain the special responsibility to the norms of rationality, we are faced with our 
problem. 
Secondly, stating the problem in this way has a metaphilosophical advantage. For it 
shows us how different debates are relevant for solving the problem. For one, we need to 
think about the nature of responsibility and control. However, we also need to think about the 
nature and the status of the norms of rationality. Thinking about their status means to think 
about how we are responsible, and thus sometimes blameworthy, for (non-)compliance with 
our reasons for attitudes. Getting clear about this kind of responsibility might give us a clue as 
to what kind of control we are searching for, or about whether this search is futile (because 
the relevant responsibility might not require control at all). Thus, theorists of responsibility 
need to think about rationality and reasons, and theorists of rationality and reasons need to 
think about responsibility.  
As long as we do not understand in what sense we are responsible for complying with 
our reasons for attitudes, and thus in what sense we can be legitimately blamed for irrational-
ity, we do not understand the status of these reasons. To see this more clearly, I will spell out 
how we might call into question the status of the norms of rationality as norms to which we 
are held responsible (i.e., how we might question (1)), and how this can give rise to three dif-
ferent approaches to our problem, before I sketch my own solution (denying (2)). 
 
4. Mental Blame and Reasons for Attitudes 
A promising line of thought for questioning (1) starts off by considering cases of trivial belief 
(section 4.1): why, one might wonder, should we be blameworthy for whether we form irra-
tional trivial beliefs – i.e., beliefs that have no impact on ourselves or others? I show how we 
can extend this line of thought to conclude in a denial of the very existence of reasons for atti-
tudes (section 4.2). If there are no such reasons, then there are no norms of rationality to 
which we could be held responsible. To avoid this position, which I label nihilism,19 we either 
 
 
have to adopt pragmatism about reasons for attitudes, i.e., the idea that some reasons for be-
lief are provided by the value of the attitude itself; or we have to make sense of epistemic 
blame and other forms of mental blame while assuming that reasons for attitudes are merely 
object-given. I call this last option, which I endorse, constitutivism.20 
 
4.1 Denying epistemic blame 
Gilbert Harman (1986: 12) famously points out that the following epistemic requirement 
would lead to “cluttering one’s mind”: 
 
(ER) One ought to believe everything that is sufficiently supported by one’s evidence. 
 
According to the recent consensus, (ER) is not plausible. To see why, consider that my cur-
rent belief-stock implies the proposition that [I am sitting in my office or the moon is made of 
cheese or Hitler is alive or there is no human-induced climate change or ...]. There is no 
doubt that this disjunctive proposition is true right now while I am sitting in my office, no 
matter how many odd (but meaningful) claims we add. It is true because the first claim, that I 
am sitting in my office, is true. At the same time, it seems that I do not always believe this 
disjunctive proposition while I am sitting in my office. Most importantly, I would neither be 
irrational nor blameworthy (or criticizable) in any sense for not believing such disjunctive 
propositions. It follows that there is no unconditional norm to believe everything that is suffi-
ciently supported by my evidence. This far, contemporary epistemologists agree.21 
Yet many philosophers want to modify (ER) to a more plausible claim by spelling out 
under which conditions our evidence requires us to believe a proposition. They thus include 
background conditions for when our sufficient evidence provides us with decisive reasons to 
believe, i.e., conditions under which sufficient evidence makes it the case that we ought to be-
lieve a proposition. In this vein, Benjamin Kiesewetter (2017: 184–185) responds to Har-
man’s clutter-objection by proposing that the central requirement of theoretical rationality is 
to believe what one’s evidence sufficiently supports if one attends to this evidence. According 
to this proposal, if I attend to the fact that I have sufficient evidence for a specific disjunctive 
proposition, then I would be irrational, and thus criticizable, if I do not come to believe it. 
Thus, I ought to believe it.22 
Yet we can reasonably wonder whether Kiesewetter’s modification will do. Steglich-
Petersen (2011) argues that epistemic reasons are not sufficient by themselves to determine 
what we ought to believe. And this, I take it, is independent of whether one attends to them. I 
 
 
may have strong evidence in favour of p to which I attend, and yet it seems that it still might 
be false that I ought to believe that p: 
 
Suppose, for example, that the subject matter is whether there is an even number of dust 
specks on S’s desk. Let us also suppose that S has excellent evidence, and thus epistemic 
reason to believe in the sense defined, that there indeed is an even number of dust specks 
on his desk. In spite of this epistemic reason, it does not seem to be the case that S ought to 
form the belief that there is an even number of dust specks on his desk. It may be that S as 
a matter of fact cannot avoid forming that belief, since we are psychologically disposed to 
form beliefs that are supported by consciously considered evidence. But it is nonetheless 
not the case that S ought to form that belief. If S failed to form the belief, we wouldn’t 
fault him or regard him as normatively worse off for that reason (Steglich-Petersen 2011: 
23). 
 
One could object that two levels of evaluation get confused here: practical and epistemic. 
Even if S is not necessarily blameworthy from a practical perspective when he does not be-
lieve on the basis of sufficient evidence, he is, according to this objection, still blameworthy 
from an epistemic perspective. However, it is important to see here that certain emotional re-
actions that are usually conceived of as forms of blame – like resentment or indignation – 
seem to be inappropriate towards the person in Steglich-Petersen’s example. Why should we 
resent S for believing some utterly unimportant truth nobody cares about? Surely, S should 
not feel guilty about failing to believe it either. Furthermore, it is unclear what, if any, conse-
quences S’s purported epistemic failure should have for future relationships with other people 
who know about this failure.23 Being epistemically irrational only once does not seem to have 
any effect on, for example, whether one is a trustworthy source of information as long as this 
single case of irrationality is an exception.24 So, in what sense then, is S blameworthy?25 
I will call any form of blame that arises merely from the fact that someone fails to 
properly base one’s doxastic attitudes (belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment) on one’s 
evidence epistemic blame. We can reasonably ask whether there is such a thing as epistemic 
blame. Until now, it seems that merely failing to believe what one’s evidence sufficiently sup-
ports does not give rise to epistemic blame. Rather, it seems that it at least has to matter in 
some way that one believes what one’s evidence sufficiently supports in order for such a re-
quirement to be placed on us. Whether it matters, however, seems not itself to be determined 
by one’s evidence, but rather a matter of practical considerations that show it to be important 
 
 
that one believes what one’s evidence sufficiently supports. If we end up blameworthy only in 
cases with such practical stakes – for example, when we fail to believe in human-induced cli-
mate change or have racist beliefs – then there does not seem to be much point in a notion of 
purely epistemic blame.26  
 
4.2 Mental blame and reasons 
Analogously to the doubts about the existence of epistemic blame arising from our considera-
tion of trivial propositions, we can formulate doubts about the existence of mental blame. I 
will call any form of blameworthiness that arises merely from the fact that someone fails to 
respond correctly to one’s reasons for attitudes mental blame. That is, if a subject is blame-
worthy for their attitude in virtue of the fact that they had indirect control over their attitude, 
then the resulting blame is not mental blame.  
Here is the initially plausible argument for a radical claim. As long as being rational 
does not matter, it seems that we cannot be blameworthy for failing to be rational. Since ob-
ject-given reasons do not necessarily indicate that having an attitude matters, failing to be ra-
tional can never, by itself, make us blameworthy. This means that there is no such thing as 
mental blame. However, if there is no such thing as mental blame, then it is hard to see how 
object-given reasons could have any normative force – it becomes doubtful whether (pur-
ported) object-given reasons for attitudes are reasons at all. Call the radical conclusion that 
there are no reasons for attitudes nihilism about reasons for attitudes.27 
One important assumption in the argument is that there are reasons for attitudes only if 
there is mental blame. We can spell out this assumption as a general condition that a kind of 
consideration must satisfy in order to be a kind of reason: 
 
Reasons and Blame (RB). Considerations of kind K are reasons for or against φ-ing only if 
we can be blameworthy for φ-ing just in virtue of the fact that φ-ing is (or seems to be)28 
decisively supported by considerations of kind K. 
 
(RB) is a very plausible principle. This is because it is a very minimal claim about how rea-
sons and blameworthiness are connected: It must be possible to be blameworthy for non-com-
pliance with these (purported) reasons. If it is not possible, a consideration does not deserve 
its status as a reason for a response. Harman’s clutter-objection from 4.1 would not get any 
grip on us if we would not assume that failing to comply to an epistemic norm is supposed to 
 
 
make us, at least normally, blameworthy or criticizable (in some sense). If we would not as-
sume this, then we could just accept that by not drawing all the implications from our current 
beliefs we fail to believe what we ought to believe: we would just constantly violate an epis-
temic norm, but that would not have any further significance. However, the normative force 
of this “ought” would then be mysterious: why comply with this norm if no one can hold us 
legitimately accountable for non-compliance? The norm would at best have the force of the 
norms of etiquette: we can reasonably ask why we have a reason to comply with the norms of 
etiquette in a given situation, and there are cases conceivable in which we ought not to com-
ply with them (cf. Kiesewetter 2017: 4). 
Epistemologists propose background conditions on epistemic norms, like Kiesewet-
ter’s attending-condition (cf. section 4.1 above), because they want to make sense of the nor-
mative force of these standards: they want to explain why it matters to us whether we comply 
with the norms, why we can be (at least normally) blamed if we fail to comply with them. The 
whole project of spelling out a notion of epistemic blame is, I take it, to understand the nor-
mative force of evidence: of why it matters to comply with epistemic norms.29 
Note that (RB) is not even controversial for objectivists about the meaning of “ought” 
and “reasons,” who claim that whether a subject ought to or has reasons to φ depends on the 
actual circumstances the subject is in rather than on what (apparent) facts about the circum-
stances are epistemically accessible to the subject. (RB) is plausible to objectivists because, 
even according to them, it is possible to be blameworthy for non-compliance with reasons: 
namely, in cases in which these reasons are accessible to the subject.30 
If (RB) is as uncontroversial as I present it, how can it support such a radical claim as 
nihilism? It only supports nihilism if we assume that we are never blameworthy merely in vir-
tue of the fact that we fail to respond correctly to (what seem to be) decisive reasons for atti-
tudes. If we were never blameworthy, then what we deem to be decisive reasons for attitudes 
would, assuming (RB), turn out to be no reason after all. They would lack the specific norma-
tive force of reasons. However, I have merely presented a case of irrational belief in the last 
subsection (the dust-speck case) where we do not seem to be blameworthy for our non-com-
pliance with (what seem to be) decisive object-given reasons for this belief (i.e., reasons pro-
vided by sufficient evidence to which you attend). How can a single case support such a gen-
eral conclusion? 
To see how it might support such a conclusion, note how the dust-speck case shares a 
general structure with analogous examples: S does not believe some unimportant proposition 
 
 
p even though S has sufficient evidence for p (to which S attends). If all cases with this gen-
eral structure imply that S is not blameworthy, then it seems that we are never blameworthy in 
virtue of the fact that we fail to properly base our beliefs on our evidence. For cases in which 
the proposition is important to know seem, prima facie, not to help us to make sense of epis-
temic blame. In cases where it is morally or prudentially important to believe what is suffi-
ciently supported by the evidence, it might seem that the subject’s blameworthiness is 
grounded in moral or prudential failure, rather than in failure to base one’s belief on the evi-
dence. 
In order to support nihilism about reasons for attitudes more generally, we would need 
cases for other attitudes that are analogous to the dust-speck case in that we judge an attitude 
intuitively to be decisively supported by object-given reasons, but where the subject is not 
blameworthy for failing to comply with these (purported) reasons and where it is hard to see 
how subjects could ever be blameworthy in all structurally analogous cases. My task here is 
not to spell out these cases, because I will not endorse nihilism, but rather present a viable al-
ternative. I think, however, that a strong case for nihilism can be made by spelling out such 
cases.31 
In order to avoid nihilism about reasons for attitudes, we have two options. First, we 
could endorse pragmatism about reasons for attitudes. That is, we could argue that reasons 
for attitudes are practical reasons, rather than (merely) object-given reasons. If there were 
practical reasons, then failing to comply with these reasons would matter in a straightforward 
sense: in not responding to them correctly, we would fail to promote value. Thus, endorsing 
(RB), together with an argument that we are never blameworthy merely for failing to comply 
with our object-given reasons, can motivate pragmatism.32 In the remainder of this paper, I 
would like to explore how we could avoid nihilism while still regarding reasons for attitudes 
as purely object-given. My account will provide the material to make it intelligible how we 
are responsible to the norms of rationality, which I understood as described in section 2, i.e., 
as non-pragmatic norms to respond correctly to one’s object-given reasons. 
 
5. Blame and Irrationality 
We can motivate the idea that we are sometimes blameworthy for being irrational by focusing 
on certain emotions (section 5.1). This will give us a clue towards a general account of mental 
blame as marking the impairment of relationships (section 5.2). Understanding mental blame 
will provide a diagnosis and the outlines of a solution to the problem of mental responsibility 
(section 6). 
 
 
 
5.1 Blame for emotions 
I have motivated the threat from nihilism by thinking about epistemic blame and reasons for 
belief. I now suggest that we might get a clue about how to avert this threat by thinking about 
reasons for emotion and how we blame each other for emotional irrationality. This will sug-
gest a general account of mental blameworthiness that is also applicable in the doxastic realm. 
Take admiration and love. You can be blameworthy in some sense if and because you 
do not admire features of the world that are admirable, or if and because you do not love 
someone who is worthy of your love. Whether you are blameworthy will depend on whether 
we understand admiration and love as stable dispositions or as occurrent feelings. For we 
might well imagine a case where I am confronted with something admirable (say, I am stand-
ing in front of the ancient pyramids), but where I do not feel admiration (say, due to my being 
stressed out from travelling), and where I am not blameworthy (I am excused due to stress). 
Yet one might think that I would be blameworthy in some way if I do no not have a disposi-
tion to feel admiration for what is admirable under usual circumstances. Similarly, if I do not 
feel the love for my partner in a specific moment (say, because I am stressed out by them 
right now), this need not make me blameworthy. Yet if I do not have any disposition to feel 
love for them, I might plausibly be said to be blameworthy for this lack of love for someone 
who would deserve it. 
We here have some potential counterexamples against the nihilist’s premise that there 
is no such thing as being blameworthy in virtue of non-compliance with (purported) object-
given reasons for an attitude. How might the nihilist respond to these cases? 
They could try to deny that we are blameworthy for failing to admire the admirable 
and love whom is worthy of our love in virtue of the fact that we fail to respond correctly to 
object-given reasons for these emotions. According to this objection, we should give another 
explanation for the blameworthiness involved in such cases. A nihilist might start out with the 
following thought: When something is admirable or worthy of our love, this essentially in-
volves practical considerations in some way, i.e., considerations that explain why it matters 
to have these emotions. More precisely, they could argue that our intuition that the emotion-
ally irrational are blameworthy arises only because we assume that they could have responded 
to these practical considerations (rather than to their object-given reasons): what they are 
blameworthy for is failing to cultivate admiration and love – for cultivating admiration and 
love is something we can do for practical reasons.  
 
 
In reply, I merely point out that we can very well imagine cases where there was no 
reasonable opportunity to cultivate admiration and love, and where our intuitions about the 
criticizability of those who fail to acknowledge admirability and lovability do not fade: there 
is still something substantially wrong with a person who fails to feel the way we would expect 
a rational person to feel when it comes to emotions like admiration and love. What exactly is 
wrong with them will become clearer when I spell out my proposal about the nature of mental 
blame below. 
A worry with the way I motivate the idea of mental blame here is that I focus on spe-
cific emotions. One might point out that, even if I am right that we blame one another for cer-
tain forms of emotional irrationality, this could at most save the idea that there are reasons for 
these emotions, but not that there can be reasons for other attitudes. We might conceive of a 
position that grants that we can be blameworthy for failing to comply with object-given rea-
sons for certain attitudes, but not for others. According to this position, there might be, for ex-
ample, no epistemic blame: we would never be directly blameworthy for our beliefs merely in 
virtue of our failure to properly base our belief on our evidence. Rather, we would be blame-
worthy only if we failed to properly manage our doxastic life. 
My objection to this position is that it is odd. It grants that there are reasons for certain 
emotions. But it denies that there are reasons for other attitudes. However, there seem to be 
too many structural analogies between reasons for attitudes for such a position to be coherent. 
The reasons in virtue of which we are blameworthy for emotional irrationality are object-
given: they are provided by the constitutive aims of admiration (the admirable) and love (the 
loveable). Also reasons for belief, desire, and intention are object-given reasons provided by 
the constitutive aim of the respective attitude. Because of this striking structural analogy, I 
deem it to be more promising to explore how we can be blameworthy also for violations of 
epistemic norms and of other norms of rationality, rather than accepting a scattered account of 
reasons for attitudes according which we can be blameworthy only for some failures of ration-
ality, but not for others. 
 
5.2 The nature of mental blame 
My suggestion is that in failing to be rational, we often display blameworthy vices.33 The ina-
bility to acknowledge the admirable and lovable is a defect in character that has specific nor-
mative consequences for our relationship with others. These normative consequences result 
from emotional irrationality independently of whether the person could manage their emotion. 
Why explore the world with someone who cannot admire its admirable features? Why be in a 
 
 
romantic relationship with someone who cannot appreciate you as being worthy of their love? 
Even though these defects in character do not, by themselves, warrant responses like resent-
ment, indignation, and guilt, they warrant blame insofar as it can be rational not to get in-
volved in specific ways with the people who suffer these defects: certain types of relation-
ships with them would necessarily be impaired.34 
The key to understanding how we can be responsible to the norms of rationality is, I 
propose, to acknowledge a broader concept of blame that goes beyond blame as essentially 
involving such passionate responses as resentment and indignation.35 If we have a broader 
concept of blame in mind, then our intuition that responsibility for attitudes requires control 
will fade, and we are free to deny claim (2) of the problem of mental responsibility.  
Angela Smith argues that some reactions rightly deserve the label “blame” without in-
volving passionate components (2013: 32).36 Especially when blaming loved ones for moral 
failures, we might do so without hostile emotions. Furthermore, we might mark an impair-
ment in our relationship to someone by “dispassionately ‘unfriending’ someone on one’s Fa-
cebook page, for example, or by simply refusing to trust anymore, and these too should qual-
ify as blame” (ibid.). According to such a concept of blame, viewing the relationship to some-
one as impaired just is the blame (Hieronymi 2004). 
Thus, here is a sketch of the general account of mental blame I propose.37 If we come 
to see a person’s irrational vices, we might reconsider our relationship with them. We might 
want no longer to be friends with the person. We might cease to promote their personal projects 
or not take pleasure in their successes when we see that they adopt their aims and choose their 
means only because they are greedy, weak-willed, cowardly, intemperate, ungenerous, unjust, 
gullible, or dogmatic. According to Owens, when I am gullible, then “I cannot be trusted to 
think and feel as I ought” (2000: 124). We might also no longer want to please the person whose 
viciousness we have discovered, and no longer accept credit from them for our own actions. 
We might doubt their judgments more generally because of a general sense of distrust we de-
velop towards them. These are all reactions we can only show to fully responsible beings, be-
cause we can only have the relationships that are presupposed by these reactions towards fully 
responsible beings. Neither computer nor children can display such defects in character that 
give rise to the reactions described above. Furthermore, I take this form of criticism, insofar as 
it is legitimate, to be grounded (at least partially) in the vicious person’s irrationality. For a fully 
rational person is not blameworthy. 
What could epistemic blame be like according to this general account of mental 
blame? We should grant that there are cases of epistemic blame, i.e. cases where a subject’s 
 
 
blameworthiness is grounded merely in the fact that they fail to believe what their evidence 
sufficiently supports (i.e., cases analogous to the dust-speck case). Kauppinen (2018) pro-
poses that epistemic blame is a form of distrust. To distrust someone epistemically is, in some 
way, more than just treating them as an unreliable source of information – as we would do 
with a computer that makes unreliable predictions. 
I might epistemically distrust someone insofar as I am not ready to provide them with 
information because I fear that the person will draw the false conclusions from the infor-
mation. Consider Tom, who always irrationally suspects other people to conspire against him. 
If I tell Tom that two of his colleagues recently meet more often for lunch than usual, he 
might interpret this – irrationally – as evidence that they conspire against him. Tom is not 
trustworthy epistemically because he is paranoid. His epistemic irrationality is a manifestation 
of some vice – a defect in his epistemic character. Distrusting Tom is compatible with assum-
ing that he could not have avoided the rational defect he suffers. Yet my distrust is grounded 
in this defect, and only in this defect. I do not want to provide Tom with certain information 
because I do not trust him that he will understand its implications. 
Even though legitimate distrust seems to presuppose that one’s epistemic irrationality 
is not just an occasional lapse, there is nothing more I need to know about Tom than that he 
regularly fails to properly base his beliefs on his evidence when it comes to certain topics in 
order to for it to be rational to distrust him epistemically. I can view my epistemic relationship 
to Tom as impaired in certain respects. Part of this relationship is that we regard each other as 
trustworthy sources of information, and that we know about each other that we draw the right 
conclusions from the information we provide each other with. We cannot view our relation-
ship with an unreliable computer as impaired in this way, because we do not have such rela-
tionships with computers. 
I think Tom is a plausible example of someone who is epistemically blameworthy. We 
might not necessarily be blameworthy for failing to believe what our evidence supports (even 
if we attend to it). A person is not blameworthy for occasional lapses in their epistemic ration-
ality. Similarly, people are not blameworthy for occasional lapses in their moral conduct (e.g., 
some lapses due to stress). However, as soon as there is some kind of pattern behind these 
cases of irrationality – if irrationality cannot be excused as an occasional lapse –, we view our 
relationship to irrational people as impaired in specific ways, e.g., by partly losing our epis-
temic trust. If irrationality adds up in such a pattern, it begins to matter for our relationship to 
the person, and consequently for our actions related to the person. Yet our blame is not 
 
 
grounded in the fact that the person violated any practical requirement. It is grounded in the 
fact that the person violated (and might violate again) the standards of attitudinal rationality. 
The existence of purely epistemic blame is what epistemic instrumentalist accounts à 
la Steglich-Petersen fail to capture when they argue that the normative force of evidence de-
pends on further aims that are promoted by believing what the evidence supports.38 Being ir-
rational, which includes failing to believe what one’s evidence supports, is sometimes suffi-
cient to make us blameworthy. In this sense, evidence has normative force on its own.  
 
6. The diagnosis: responsibility and reasons without control 
The problem of mental responsibility originally got a grip on us because we assumed that we 
are responsible only for what we control (cf. section 3.1). We here assumed that the control at 
issue is voluntary control. According to my proposal, having (indirect) voluntary control over 
an attitude is not a necessary condition for blame if we have the broader concept of blame in 
mind, and do not think about such responses as indignation, resentment, and guilt. Our mis-
take was to assume that being blameworthy for our irrationality would require that we are, in 
some way, in control of our attitudes. 
My diagnosis is that we made this assumption because we still thought of blame as in-
volving the passionate emotions that are essential for moral blame, like indignation, etc. It 
was a mistake to think of blame only in this narrow way. Without justification, we took this 
narrow concept of blame out of the conceptual space where it is at home – the domain of vol-
untariness and control – and tried to force it to live in a hostile environment – the domain of 
reasons and rationality. Yet being subject to the will and under our control is one thing, while 
being part of the space of reasons is another.39 Our attitudes are within the space of reasons 
without always being under our control. Consequently, the way we blame one another for 
non-compliance with the norms of rationality must also be different from the way we blame 
one another for violating requirements that presuppose voluntary control: mental blame is not 
moral blame. 
My proposed solution is thus a hybrid account of mental responsibility: On the one 
hand, we are indirectly responsible for our attitudes, and this face of responsibility can make 
us fitting objects of passionate forms of moral blame for our attitudes. On the other hand, if 
our attitudes are well-supported by object-given reasons, we are rational, and if they are 
poorly supported by object-given reasons, we are irrational. These kinds of evaluation do not 
 
 
presuppose control in any substantial sense, and yet they have specific normative conse-
quences for our relationships towards one another that can be rationally marked by forms of 
blame. 
Let us finally return to the two intuitively plausible lines of thought mentioned in my 
introduction that pulled us towards two seemingly inconsistent accounts of mental responsi-
bility (section 1). We can now say that the first line of thought is plausible if we assume a 
concept of responsibility that can be understood in terms of the passionate moral blaming-re-
sponses, while the second line of thought is plausible if we assume a concept of responsibility 
that allows for a broader understanding of blame in terms of the impairment of relationships. 
This solution allows us both to accept that we are, in the narrow sense, responsible for our at-
titudes as we are responsible for consequences of actions; and that we are, in the broad sense, 
responsible for anything that is within the space of reasons. 
Here is a final objection. Some authors claim that responsibility for attitudes can only 
be explained by reference to a form of direct, non-voluntary control that we exercise in be-
lieving, desiring, feeling, or intending.40 I have not argued that we do not exercise such con-
trol. I even granted that attitudes are responsive to reasons. Why does this not imply that we 
exercise non-voluntary control in believing, desiring, feeling, or intending? I cannot, so the 
objection goes, just endorse the idea that being subject to the norms of rationality does not re-
quire control. I would have to argue separately that attitudes are not themselves exercises of 
control. 
However, I do not claim that attitudes are not exercises of control in some sense. Ra-
ther, I claim that we need not assume that they are exercises of control in order to make it in-
telligible how we can be directly responsible for our attitudes. In order to understand how 
there can be such a thing as direct responsibility to the norms of rationality, we merely need to 
understand the nature of responsibility for our attitudes in terms of the blaming-responses that 
are made appropriate by non-compliance with rational norms. Our intuition that responsibility 
requires control fades as soon as we have the nature of these responses clearly in front of us: 
they are appropriate merely in virtue of the fact that another person has a certain character, no 
matter how the character came about. We might have to consider concepts of non-voluntary 
control is in order to solve other problems. But we need not do so in the context of under-
standing mental responsibility.41, 42 
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are “the wrong kind of reasons” undermines the project of an ethics of mind. 
12 On how “the deontological conception of epistemic justification” might become questionable, cf. Alston 
(1988). Owens (2000) views epistemic normativity to be threatened by the absence of doxastic control. More 
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14 Cf. esp. Kavka (1983). On how we exercise agency in deciding, cf. Soteriou’s contribution in this volume (ch. 
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15 I owe the idea of stating philosophical problems in such a way to Gerhard Ernst, cf. esp. Ernst (2008: 65–71). 
16 Accounts that are affected by the latter problem include Chrisman (2008; 2018; ch. 3 in this volume), Meylan 
(2013; 2017), and Peels (2017). I do not claim that I have argued here that the problem cannot be met. Rather, 
given the intuitive significance of the norms of rationality, these accounts face an intuitive problem. 
17 For an account along these lines, cf. Rinard (2015; 2017). More moderate versions of pragmatism, like the one 
of McCormick (2015) or Reisner (2008; 2009), argue that the rationality of belief is at least sometimes a matter 
of responding correctly to practical reasons for belief – i.e., reasons that show that state of believing to be valua-
ble in some way (either prudentially or morally). These more moderate versions could still grant that we are 
sometimes blameworthy merely for being epistemically irrational. However, they would then not avoid the as-
sumption that we are directly responsible for being epistemically (ir)rational. Only radical pragmatists (like Ri-
nard) and those who deny any form of direct responsibility (like Meylan and Peels) for attitudes can straightfor-
wardly avoid this assumption. 
18 Saying that certain norms are constitutive for attitudes also means that attitudes can be individuated by refer-
ence to the norms by which they are governed. Anscombe (1957, sect. 2) provides such an individuation with her 
“direction of fit”-distinction between beliefs and desires: “beliefs ought to fit the world,” but this is not true for 
desires. Rather, we “ought to fit the world to our desires.” The Ought in question here is the Ought of rationality 
– if one realizes that it is false that p, then it is not rational to, instead of giving up the belief, continue believing 
it and to rather adjust the world to one’s belief. Also the debate about belief’s “aim of truth,” (Chan 2013) – an 
aim that must be different from the aim of, for example, intending, but also different from the aim of guessing or 
suspecting, which arguably also aim at coming to a true guess or a true suspicion in some sense (Owens 2003: 
290) – is concerned with the constitutive norms of belief. 
19 I take the label from Kiesewetter (ms) who mainly discusses (and rejects) the weaker claim that reasons for 
belief are not normative reasons. On recent sympathies with nihilism or the weaker claim, see Papineau (2013), 
Rinard (2015), Glüer/Wikforss (2018), Maguire/Woods (forthcoming; ms), Mantel (2019); for a critical discus-
sion, see Paakkunainen (2018). Maguire (2018) argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. 
20 I choose this label because, as I mentioned in section 3.3, I take the norms of rationality, which I understand as 
norms to comply with one’s object-given reasons, to be constitutive norms. See also note 18 above. 
21 One might doubt that I do not believe the disjunctive proposition. For if I was asked whether I believe it, and I 
understand the content of the proposition, I will reply that I do believe it. However, even if one thinks that we 
believe all those disjunctive propositions, one will agree that we do not believe all the implications of our current 
belief-stock, like certain mathematical or logical implications that are just too hard to figure out. That we do not 
believe those implications does not make us blameworthy or criticizable in any sense. Furthermore, we can im-
agine a case where I fail to believe such weird disjunctive propositions. Why on earth, we might ask, should any 
reasonable person care about this so much as to regard me as blameworthy for not believing them? 
22 In a recent paper, Kiesewetter (ms) acknowledges that there is another, probably more difficult, problem for 
the normativity of epistemic rationality than Harman’s clutter objection. This further problem arises from the 
 
 
 
question whether we have a reason to care about being rational. While Harman’s clutter-objection can be met, 
according to Kiesewetter, with the attending-condition for requirements of theoretical rationality, this condition 
cannot explain why we have a reason to care about being epistemically rational. Steglich-Petersen’s dust-speck 
case, which I present below, might be understood as exactly raising this question of why we should care about 
being rational. Kiesewetter’s solution to this new problem about reasons to care builds on Wedgwood’s (2017) 
idea that rationality is a virtue. Since we always have a reason to care about being virtuous, we always have a 
reason to care about being rational. This fits well with my account of why and how we are blameworthy for fail-
ing to comply with our object-given reasons (cf. section 5). 
23 I here have in mind Scanlon’s (2008) concept of blame, to which I return in section 5 below. 
24 It would thus not be appropriate to reduce epistemic trust in the person. Reducing epistemic trust is the essence 
of epistemic blame, according Antti Kauppinen (2018). I return to this idea at the end of section 5. 
25 One could argue that S is blameworthy from a practical perspective if one thinks that believing what is not suf-
ficiently supported by one’s evidence is always morally blameworthy (Clifford 1877). However, this is not only 
highly questionable (Schmidt 2017; Lindner in this volume, ch. 2), it also does not avoid that non-compliance to 
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evidence.] The normative force of this “ought” is as mysterious as the normative force of the “ought” in (ER) 
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27 I here follow the terminology employed by Kiesewetter (ms). Kiesewetter distinguishes between anti-norma-
tivism, which claims that object-given reasons are no normative reasons for attitudes, and nihilism, which claims 
that object-given reasons are no reasons for attitudes at all. The distinction does not matter for my purposes. I 
think that denying the normative force of reasons is to deny their status as reasons. I agree with Kiesewetter that 
there is no plausible account of object-given reasons as non-normative reasons for attitudes. 
28 The reading in brackets is necessary for the nihilist or the (radical) pragmatist when they want to argue that 
evidence does not provide us with reasons to believe. For according to them, evidence alone never decisively 
supports a proposition. It merely seems as if it does. 
29 Two such recent accounts of epistemic blame which I think are clearly motivated in this way are Brown 
(2018) and Kauppinen (2018). 
30 On objectivism and subjectivism, cf. the discussions in Kiesewetter (2017, ch. 8) and Lord (2018, ch. 8). 
31 I spell out the case for nihilism in more detail in part II of Schmidt (ms). 
32 As a response to the problem of mental responsibility, pragmatism can most straightforwardly understood as 
presenting an alternative account of the rationality of attitudes (in terms of practical reasons rather than object-
given reasons), thus endorsing (1) and, most commonly, also (2), but denying (3). However, pragmatists are not 
per se committed to either (2) or (3). My point is merely that pragmatist accounts of reasons for attitudes could 
motivate, or make more plausible, specific solutions to the problem by being accounts about to what kind of 
norms we are supposed to be held accountable. 
33 This is motivated by Wedgwood’s (2017) account of rationality as a virtue as well as Kiesewetter’s (ms) pro-
posal to make our reasons to care about rationality intelligible by acknowledging rationality as a virtue. 
34 It is important to note that I do not argue for some kind of elitism of those who are rational. Saying that rela-
tionships with the irrational are impaired does not imply that we are never allowed to enter such relationships, or 
that we should not enter into other types of relationships with people who are irrational. Arguably, we are all ir-
rational in certain ways. Rather, my claim is much weaker: that someone is irrational is a pro tanto reason not 
enter certain types of relationship with the person. The types of relationship will depend on the kind of irrational-
ity at issue. 
35 Wallace defends this narrow concept of blame when he argues that “it would indeed be strange to suppose that 
one might blame another person without feeling an attitude of indignation or resentment toward the person, or 
that one might blame oneself without feeling guilt” (1994: 75). 
36 Here Smith follows especially Scanlon (2008). 
37 The kind of effect such vices can have on our interpersonal relationships is nicely captured by Scanlon’s 
(2008) account of blame, which is taken up and refined by Hieronymi (2004; 2019) and Smith (2013). 
38 See esp. sect. 4.1 above. Next to Steglich-Petersen (2011), cf. Steglich-Petersen/Skipper (this volume, ch. 6). 
39 This is the central point of Owens (2000). 
40 Cf. esp. Boyle (2013); Hieronymi (2006; 2008; 2014; ms); Smith (2005). For some objections against these 
views, cf. Chrisman (this volume, ch. 3, sect. 5). 
 
 
 
41 One such context might be the problem of understanding how there can be agency in a world that is dominated 
by natural law – i.e., the traditional problem of free will (cf. Hieronymi ms). 
42 I am grateful to Dorothee Bleisch, Matthew Chrisman, Gerhard Ernst, Pamela Hieronymi, Christian Kietz-
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